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Modeling	Minimal	Conditions	for	Inequity	September	6,	2017	Cailin	O’Connor	Abstract:	This	paper	describes	a	class	of	idealized	models	that	illuminate	minimal	conditions	for	inequity.		Some	such	models	will	track	the	actual	causal	factors	that	generate	real	world	inequity.		Others	may	not.		Whether	or	not	these	models	do	track	these	real-world	factors	is	irrelevant	to	the	epistemic	role	they	play	in	showing	that	minimal	commonplace	factors	are	enough	to	generate	inequity.		In	such	cases,	it	is	the	fact	that	the	model	does	not	fit	the	world	that	makes	it	a	particularly	powerful	argumentative	tool.		As	I	will	argue,	this	epistemic	role	is	a	particularly	important	one	when	it	comes	to	modeling	inequity,	because	such	models	are	often	also	aimed	at	interventions	to	stop	it.		Given	this,	it	is	crucial	to	know	if	we	intervene	on	the	current	causes	of	inequity,	what	other,	common	social	factors	might	continue	to	contribute	to	it.				I:	Introduction	(Schelling	1971)	famously	introduced	a	simple,	agent-based	model	to	show	how	a	set	of	bare	bones	assumptions	could	generate	social	patterns	consistent	with	widespread	racial	segregation.1		His	model	assumes	that	agents	prefer	not	to	be	part	of	a	racial	minority	in	their	locale.		When	such	agents	are	randomly	placed	in	a	neighborhood,	and	given	the	opportunity	to	move	whenever	they	find	themselves	in	such	a	racial	minority,	the	entire	community	will	eventually	end	up	segregated	under	many	conditions.			As	it	turns	out,	successful	explanations	for	racial	segregation	turn	on	many	other	factors,	including	more	active	bias	against	those	in	oppressed	racial	groups.		In	other	words,	as	a	full	explanation	for	why	there	is	real	world	segregation,	Schelling's	model	fails.		This	does	not	mean,	though,	that	Schelling's	model	does	not	tell	us	something	about	the	world,	or	that	it	was	not,	in	the	end,	important.		I	will	describe	in	this	paper	a	class	of	idealized	models	that	illuminate	what	I	call	minimal	conditions	for	inequity.			I	argue	that	these	models	can	play	an	important	epistemic	role	that	might	not	be	initially	obvious.		Some	such	models	will	track	the	actual	causal	factors	that	generate	real	world	inequity.		Others,	like	Schelling's	model,	may	or	may	not.		Whether	or	not	these	models	do	track	these	real-world	factors	is	irrelevant	to	the	epistemic	role	they	play	in	showing	that	minimal	commonplace																																																									1	This	model	was	previously	given	a	briefer	description	in	(Schelling	1969).		It	was	actually	preempted	by	James	Sakoda,	who	developed	a	precursor	model	in	his	1949	dissertation,	and	published	his	full	model	a	few	months	before	Schelling	did	(Sakoda	1971),	as	outlined	by	(Hegselmann	2017).	
factors	are	enough	to	generate	inequity.		In	these	cases,	in	fact,	sometimes	it	is	the	fact	that	the	model	does	not	fit	the	world	that	makes	it	a	particularly	powerful	argumentative	tool.		As	I	will	argue,	this	epistemic	role	is	a	particularly	important	one	for	modeling	inequity,	because	such	models	are	often	also	aimed	at	interventions	to	stop	it.		Given	this,	it	is	important	to	know	if	we	intervene	on	the	current	causes	of	inequity,	what	other,	common	social	factors	might	continue	to	contribute	to	it.			I	will	proceed	by	examining	in	detail	the	epistemic	implications	of	several	models	of	injustice.		Schelling's	model	will	be	one	of	these,	but,	in	particular,	I	will	focus	on	a	set	of	models	looking	at	how	norms	and	conventions	of	bargaining	and	resource	division	emerge	between	social	groups.		(Axtell,	Epstein,	and	Young	2001)	present	an	early	model	showing	that	under	very	bare	conditions	discriminatory	norms	of	this	sort	can	emerge.		More	recently,	along	with	co-authors,	I	have	expanded	this	exploration	to	consider	how	minority	status,	power,	intersectional	effects,	various	psychological	features,	and	social	network	structure	influence	the	emergence	of	such	norms	(Bruner	2017;	O’Connor	and	Bruner	2017;	Bruner	and	O’Connor	2017;	O’Connor	2017b,	2017a;	Rubin	and	O’Connor	2017;	O’Connor,	Bright,	and	Bruner	2017).		These	models,	like	Schelling’s	model,	abstract	away	from	many	complex	psychological,	and	structural	details	involved	in	the	emergence	of	inequitable	norms.		As	I	will	argue,	though,	they	still	give	us	important	counterfactual	information	about	how	little	is	needed	to	generate	discrimination.		And	this	information	is	critical	to	thinking	about	possible	interventions.	I	will	proceed	as	follows.		Section	two	very	briefly	describes	Schelling's	famous	model	of	racial	segregation	and	outlines	some	empirical	work	which	may	be	taken	to	attenuate	the	importance	of	its	insights.		Section	three	describes	the	emergence	of	classes	model	introduced	by	(Axtell,	Epstein,	and	Young	2001),	and	the	models	outlined	by	collaborators	and	myself	intended	to	explore	various	aspects	of	the	emergence	of	inequitable	norms.		As	I	make	explicit,	these	models	abstract	away	from	important	psychological	and	social	factors	implicated	in	inequity.		In	section	four,	I	make	the	main	arguments	of	the	paper---that	despite	certain	failures	to	represent,	and,	surprisingly,	sometimes	because	of	these	very	failures,	the	models	described	nonetheless	provide	crucial	information	to	those	interested	in	social	interventions	aimed	at	decreasing	inequity.	Section	five	briefly	concludes.	II:	Schelling’s	Model	of	Neighborhood	Segregation	Schelling’s	famous	model	of	neighborhood	segregation	is	easy	to	understand.		Imagine	a	checkerboard	with	black	and	white	pieces	placed	randomly	about	it,	so	that	there	are	still	a	good	number	of	empty	spaces.		The	squares	of	the	board	represent	locations	in	a	neighborhood,	and	the	pieces	represent	homeowners	of	two	racial	groups.		Suppose	further	that	everyone	prefers	not	to	be	in	too	small	a	racial	minority	in	their	immediate	neighborhood,	represented	by	the	eight	squares	surrounding	them.		This	is	instantiated	in	the	model	by	identifying	which	checker	pieces	are	‘dissatisfied’	and	moving	them,	one	after	another,	to	the	nearest	empty	square	where	they	will	no	longer	be	below	their	minority	threshold.		This	process	is	
iterated	until	everyone	is	satisfied	with	their	location,	and	the	checkerboard/neighborhood	is	at	equilibrium.	What	Schelling	showed	is	that	strong	patterns	of	segregation	can	emerge	on	the	neighborhood	level	as	the	result	of	these	individual	preferences	and	actions.		For	example,	when	the	two	groups	are	of	equal	sizes,	preferences	on	both	sides	to	not	be	in	less	than	a	~1/3	minority	tend	to	lead	to	segregation.		To	understand	this,	let’s	imagine	the	subsequent	moves	by	individuals	in	Schelling’s	model.		If	a	white	individual	moves	towards	two	other	whites,	this	might	make	the	area	unsatisfactory	for	a	black	neighbor,	who	leaves,	making	it	unsatisfactory	for	other	black	neighbors,	who	also	leave,	etc.		When	iterated,	these	subsequent	adjustments	lead	to	broad	patterns	of	segregation.		While	Schelling	derived	these	results	using	literal	checkerboards	and	the	like,	subsequent	authors	have	confirmed	and	expanded	them	with	more	sophisticated	computational	modeling	methods	(Pancs	and	Vriend	2007;	Rogers	and	McKane	2011).	Schelling	intended	his	model	as	a	demonstration	of	how	discrimination	on	the	part	of	individuals	can	lead	to	community	level	segregation,	and,	more	generally,	as	a	demonstration	of	how	individual	decision	making	can	lead	to	unexpected	group	dynamics.		One	further	point	that	many	have	taken	away	from	the	model	is	that	racism	of	a	pernicious	form	is	not	necessary	to	explain	racial	segregation.		Individuals	can	even	prefer	mixed	neighborhoods,	but	have	a	stronger	preference	that	they	themselves	not	be	in	a	small	racial	minority,	and	we	should	expect	segregation	to	emerge	robustly.		In	other	words,	remarkably	little	is	needed	to	generate	segregated	neighborhoods.	Does	the	Schelling	model	explain	racial	segregation?		It	certainly	does	not	capture	the	full	picture	(and	Schelling	was	well	aware	of	this).		A	further	question	is	whether	it	captures	key	causal	factors	responsible	for	segregation.		Many	other,	perhaps	more	important	factors,	seem	to	be	at	play.		Exclusionary	zoning	practices	played	a	large	role,	traditionally,	in	segregating	neighborhoods.		Various	studies	have	shown	that	real-estate	agents	steer	white	home	buyers	towards	largely	white	neighborhoods,	likely	contributing	to	segregation	(Galster	and	Godfrey	2005).		Discriminatory	mortgage	and	lending	practices	prevent	minority	families	from	entering	wealthy	white	neighborhoods	(Denton	2006;	de	Leeuw	et	al.	2007).		Government	housing	policies	promote	segregation	(de	Leeuw	et	al.	2007).		And	even	preferences	for	neighborhood	make-up,	where	relevant,	may	not	quite	fit	Schelling’s	picture.		(Farley,	Fielding,	and	Krysan	1997),	for	example,	finds	that	black	people	may	be	hesitant	to	live	in	largely	white	neighborhoods	due	to	fear	of	bias	and	discrimination,	rather	than	due	to	simple	preference	to	be	near	like-individuals.		They	also	find	asymmetries	in	preferences	for	racial	make-up	of	neighborhoods,	with	black	people	preferring	mixed	neighborhoods,	and	white	people	showing	an	increasing	unwillingness	to	live	in	a	neighborhood	as	the	proportion	of	black	people	increases.	The	story	that	emerges	is	one	where	the	kinds	of	mild	preferences	for	in-group	neighbors	that	play	the	key	causal	role	in	explaining	segregation	in	Schelling’s	
model	are	probably	not	the	causal	factors	that	most	significantly	contribute	to	real	world	segregation.			Does	this	mean	that	Schelling’s	model	is	unimportant?		That	it	doesn’t	tell	us	something	about	the	real	world?		In	the	next	section,	I	will	describe	a	different	sort	of	model,	focusing	on	the	emergence	of	inequitable	norms.		As	I	will	then	argue,	Schelling’s	model,	and	these	models	of	inequity,	play	a	similar	epistemic	role	that	tells	us	about	the	real	world,	but	does	not	require	that	the	models	faithfully	represent	real	communities.	III.	Models	of	the	Emergence	of	Inequitable	Norms	Empirical	literature	has	revealed	that	women	and	racial	minorities	tend	to	get	less	on	average	in	scenarios	of	resources	division	than	men	and	white	people	(Yinger	1986;	Ayres	and	Siegelman	1995;	Steinpreis,	Anders,	and	Ritzke	1999;	Bertrand	and	Mullainathan	2004).		Furthermore,	this	pattern	seems	to	be	normative	in	the	sense	that	individuals	think	that	women	and	racial	minorities	ought	not	demand	too	much,	and	are	sometimes	willing	to	punish	those	who	do	(Bowles,	Babcock,	and	Lai	2007;	Tinsley	et	al.	2009).		This	observation	will	(likely)	not	come	as	a	shock	–	the	evidence	is	irrefutable	that	throughout	human	cultures,	some	types	of	people	get	more	and	others	get	less.	(Axtell,	Epstein,	and	Young	2001)	provide	an	early	model	explaining	this	sort	of	phenomenon	via	the	emergence	of	what	they	label	discriminatory	norms.2		Their	model	involves	agents	of	two	types	(men	or	women,	black	or	white	people,	etc.)	who	interact	in	a	bargaining	scenario	called	a	Nash	demand	game.		This	involves	dividing	a	resource	(let’s	say	of	size	100),	by	requesting	a	low,	medium,	or	high	amount	of	it	(say	30,	50,	or	70).			If	the	demands	are	compatible	–	add	up	to	100	or	less	–	each	agent	gets	what	they	request.		Otherwise,	they	get	nothing,	because	they	are	jointly	too	aggressive	to	reach	an	agreement.	In	the	model,	each	agent	remembers	their	last	n	interactions	with	the	two	different	types	of	individuals,	and	uses	these	memories	to	decide	which	demand	to	pick.		In	particular,	they	choose	the	demand	that	would	have	done	best	against	those	they	met	in	the	past.		So	suppose	the	two	types	are	men	and	women,	that	the	last	five	men	Jane	met	demanded	70,	and	that	the	last	five	women	she	met	demanded	50.		The	next	time	Jane	meets	a	man	she	will	demand	30,	which	would	have	done	best	against	her	memories,	and	the	next	time	she	meets	a	woman	she	will	demand	50.	What	the	authors	find	is	that	simulations	of	this	model	–	where	agents	meet	each	other	randomly,	and	update	their	memories	each	time	–	often	arrive	at	stable	patterns	where	each	type	demands	50	of	those	in	their	own	group,	but	between	groups	one	side	always	demands	70	and	the	other	30.		In	other	words,	everyone	treats	in-groupers	fairly,	and	treats	out-grouper	differently	to	the	detriment	of	one	out-group.		This	pattern	emerges	quite	commonly	despite	the	fact	that	a	fair	outcome	is	possible	between	the	two	groups,	and	that	the	two	groups	are																																																									2	In	designing	their	model,	they	draw	on	previous	work	by	(H.	P.	Young	1993;	H.	Peyton	Young	1993).	
completely	symmetric.		In	other	words,	there	is	nothing	to	explain	the	inequity,	besides	the	bare	existence	of	social	categories.			Along	with	co-authors,	I	have	used	this	sort	of	model,	and	many	variations	of	it,	as	a	framework	for	understanding	the	emergence	of	inequitable	norms,	and	especially	for	exploring	the	conditions	under	which	one	social	group	tends	to	get	more	than	another.3		For	example,	inspired	by	the	work	of	(Bruner	2017),	he	and	I	have	shown	that	under	many	circumstances	the	bare	fact	of	minority	status	increases	the	likelihood	that	a	social	group	will	end	up	being	discriminated	against	in	these	models.		This	occurs	because	minorities	meet	their	out-group	very	commonly,	while	majorities	meet	them	only	rarely.		As	a	result,	minorities	tend	to	learn	more	quickly	how	to	interact	with	their	out-group,	which,	in	a	bargaining	scenario,	often	involves	making	low,	safe,	accommodating	demands	(30	rather	than	50	or	70).		The	majority	group	can	then	slowly	learn	to	take	advantage	of	this	accommodation.		We	call	this	the	cultural	Red	King	effect	after	an	analogous	effect	in	biology	where	a	slow	evolving	species	can	gain	an	advantage	in	mutualisms.		(See	(Bergstrom	and	Lachmann	2003)	for	the	biological	version	of	the	effect,	and	(Bruner	2017;	O’Connor	2017b;	O’Connor	and	Bruner	2017;	O’Connor	2017a)	for	our	work	on	the	cultural	version.)			We	also	explore	the	effects	of	power	on	the	emergence	of	such	norms,	arguing	that	various	sorts	of	empowerment	can	increase	the	likelihood	that	a	social	group	will	end	up	at	an	advantaged	norm	in	terms	of	resource	division	(Bruner	and	O’Connor	2017;	O’Connor	2017a).		In	(O’Connor,	Bright,	and	Bruner	2017)	we	use	these	minority	and	power	effects	to	explore	what	happens	to	particularly	small	or	disempowered	intersectional	groups.		We	find	that	identities	at	the	intersection	of	two	minority	or	disempowered	groups	can	be	especially	disadvantaged	in	these	models.		In	(Rubin	and	O’Connor	2017),	we	explore	the	emergence	of	such	norms	on	a	network,	and	look	at	how	discrimination	changes	patterns	of	social	interaction.		In	particular,	we	find	that	a	sort	of	interactive	segregation,	or	homophily,	emerges	as	those	being	discriminated	against	learn	to	avoid	their	discriminators.	IV:	Modeling	Minimal	Conditions	for	Inequity	Like	Schelling’s	model,	the	models	described	in	the	last	section	are	all	high	idealized,	by	which	I	mean	that	they	ignore	and	alter	real	world	features	of	the	systems	they	represent.4		No	model	can	embody	every	possible	modeling	virtue	(for	example,	by	being	maximally	simple,	causally	transparent,	and	perfectly	accurate),	so	modelers	must	choose	to	elevate	some	virtues	over	others	(Weisberg	2012).		These	particular																																																									3	For	those	who	care	about	such	distinctions,	many	of	the	results	I	now	mention	are	from	population	models	using	the	replicator	dynamics,	rather	than	agent-based	models	like	those	used	by	(Axtell,	Epstein,	and	Young	2001).		The	work	all	involves	the	use	of	Nash	demand	games	and	social	categories	within	a	population	to	see	how	patterns	of	resource	division	emerge	that	disadvantage	those	in	one	social	group.	4	We	might	draw	a	distinction	here	between	models	that	are	abstract,	meaning	that	they	ignore	some	features	of	the	world,	and	models	that	are	idealized,	meaning	that	they	alter	these	features	in	some	way.		These	models	are	actually	both.	
models	opt	for	causal	transparency	and	simplicity	over	complexity	and	fit	to	real	phenomena.			This	means	that	they	illuminate	causal	pathways	that	could	potentially	occur	in	real	societies,	but	that	the	fit	to	the	real	world	is	less	tight,	and	so	the	applicability	of	the	model	is	typically	in	question.	Philosophers	of	science	have	sometimes	described	such	models	as	minimal	or	minimalistic.		A	typical	goal	of	minimalistic	models	is	to	pare	away	irrelevant	details	from	real	world	processes	to	arrive	at	a	few	key,	causal	factors	for	the	target	phenomenon	(Weisberg	2007).5		These	models	explain	the	phenomenon	at	hand	by	virtue	of	properly	representing	the	corresponding	causal	factors	in	the	world,	even	if	they	do	not	represent	other,	irrelevant	aspects	of	the	real	world	system.6		Models	that	explore	minimal	conditions	for	inequity,	such	as	the	Schelling	model,	may	sometimes	capture	the	most	relevant	causal	factors	at	play	in	the	world,	and	when	they	do	they	can	act	as	minimalist	models,	though	they	need	not	play	this	role	to	be	informative.		In	other	words,	although	the	models	I	consider	here,	and	minimalist	models,	are	all	highly	idealized,	they	play	distinct	explanatory	roles	that	need	not	always	go	hand	in	hand.	Before	further	discussing	the	epistemic	role	this	paper	attempts	to	illuminate,	I’d	like	to	note	that	I	talk	about	models	here	in	a	slightly	different	way	than	is	standardly	done	in	the	philosophy	of	modeling	literature.		This	is	because	philosophers	of	modeling	usually	describe	a	model	itself	as	‘minimal’	or	‘how-possibly’	etc.		I	prefer	to	think	of	models	and	their	explanatory	roles	as	separate,	because	the	same	model,	applied	to	the	same	target	system,	can	play	multiple,	different	roles	in	various	arguments,	even	within	the	same	modeling	project.		((Jhun,	Palacios,	and	Weatherall	2017)	make	a	similar	argument.)		I’ll	return	to	this	idea	shortly.		One	of	the	most	glaring	representational	lacunas	in	the	models	described	in	the	last	section	has	to	do	with	the	psychological	factors	involved	in	discrimination	and	inequity.		Implicit	bias,	explicit	bias,	stereotype	threat,	and	confirmation	bias	for																																																									5	There	is	wide	variation	in	philosophy	of	modeling	over	what	is	called	minimal	or	minimalist	modeling.		As	just	described	(Weisberg	2007,	2012)	outlines	minimalist	idealization	as	a	strategy	of	paring	models	down	to	only	the	most	relevant	causal	factors.		(See	also	(Potochnik	2007;	Strevens	2008).)		On	the	other	hand,	(Batterman	2002;	Batterman	and	Rice	2014)	argue	that	‘minimal’	models	explain	by	virtue	of	belonging	to	a	‘universality	class’	that	also	includes	real,	complex	systems.		On	this	story,	the	representation	relation	between	model	and	system	is	not	supposed	to	do	the	work	in	allowing	the	model	to	tell	us	something	about	real	systems.		In	yet	another	use	of	the	term	(Grüne-Yanoff	2009),	describes	minimal	models	as	lacking,	“any	similarity,	isomorphism	or	resemblance	relation	to	the	world”	and	“unconstrained	by	natural	laws	or	structural	identity”	(83).	Such	models	improve	our	understanding	of	the	world	via	proofs	of	impossibility	or	necessity.		(See	also	(Knuuttila	2009).)		While	the	terms	are	the	same,	the	epistemic	roles	of	these	various	models	are	very	different.		I	use	the	term	in	the	sense	of	(Weisberg	2007,	2012). 6	Unsurprisingly,	because	of	the	idealizations	inherent	in	building	minimal	models,	some	have	argued	that	they	cannot,	in	fact,	explain,	or	that	their	capacity	to	do	so	is	limited	in	various	ways	(Fumagalli	2015,	2016),	though	this	discussion	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.		
example,	are	clearly	important	causes	of	the	emergence	of	inequity	across	social	groups.7			In	the	models	described,	however,	the	factors	that	lead	to	inequity	are	very	basic,	and	do	not	involve	these	psychological	elements	–	1)	actors	learn	to	do	what	is	best	for	them,	2)	actors	condition	their	choice	of	behavior	on	the	social	identity	of	their	interactive	partners,	and	3)	actors	regularly	engage	in	bargaining	scenarios.		In	the	various	extensions	mentioned,	we	add	that	actors	may	be	in	a	minority	group	(that	is	otherwise	identical	to	the	majority	group),	or	that	actors	on	one	side	may	have	more	power	in	a	very	minimal	sense	of	the	word.	Furthermore,	these	models	lack	other	structural	elements	that	are	important	causal	factors	in	the	emergence	and	stability	of	inequitable	norms.		For	instance,	when	inheritance	systems	ensure	that	a	wealthy	class	tends	to	stay	wealthy,	these	reproduced	wealth	inequalities	contribute	to	the	inequitable	norms	governing	interactions	between	classes.		Our	models,	and	those	from	(Axtell,	Epstein,	and	Young	2001)	do	not	involve	any	sort	of	generational	structure,	and	lack	much	in	the	way	of	representations	of	economic	empowerment.	The	Schelling	model,	and	models	of	the	emergence	of	inequitable	norms,	then,	have	much	in	common.		Both	sorts	of	models	produce	phenomena	that	bear	similarities	to	patterns	seen	in	the	real	world.		Both	sorts	of	models	involve	causal	factors	that	are	realistic,	and	could	very	plausibly	be	important	in	the	sorts	of	cases	they	represent	(preference	not	to	be	in	a	small	in-group	for	Schelling,	and	conditions	1-3	above	for	us).		However,	in	both	cases	there	are	important	causal	factors	not	included	in	the	model,	but	that	almost	certainly	act	to	produce	the	phenomenon	in	question	in	the	real	world.	Do	these	models	tell	us	anything	then?		Do	they	provide	understanding?		Do	they	explain?			The	argument	here	is	that	they	do.		As	mentioned,	these	models	can	act	as	minimalist	models,	inasmuch	as	their	causal	variables	are	contributing	to	the	phenomenon	of	interest	in	the	real	world.		They	have	an	orthogonal	role	to	play	as	well,	though,	which	is	to	outline	which	ubiquitous,	bare	bones,	realistic	conditions	are	enough	to	generate	these	phenomena.		They	identify	the	reasonable,	minimal	conditions	for	some	sort	of	social	ill	to	arise.		To	play	this	role,	models	must,	1)	reproduce	some	social	ill	(segregation,	inequitable	norms)	and	2)	show	that	this	outcome	results	from	causal	variables	that	are	realistic,	minimal	commonplace	conditions	(preference	to	not	be	in	a	small	minority,	conditioning	on	social	category	membership,	etc.)		In	doing	this,	these	models	show	how	little	is	needed	to	generate	something	surprisingly	bad.	‘How-possibly’	modeling	is	a	term	that	sometimes	describes	models	which	show	that	some	phenomenon	can	in	principle	(possibly)	be	generated	from	a	set	of	starting	conditions.8			In	playing	this	epistemic	role,	how-possibly	models	often																																																									7	See,	for	example,	(Saul	2013)	for	the	effects	of	implicit	bias	and	stereotype	threat	in	academic	philosophy.	8	Like	the	term	‘minimal	models’,	‘how-possibly	models’	has	actually	been	used	to	describe	a	number	of	varying	things,	but	this	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	discussion	here.	
respond	to	an	extant	impossibility	claim.		For	example,	Brian	Skyrms’s	work	on	the	evolution	of	signaling	refuted	claims	by	natural	language	skeptics	like	W.V.O.	Quine	that	linguistic	meaning	could	not	emerge	on	its	own	(Skyrms	2010;	W.	V.	O.	Quine	1936;	W.	V.	O.	Quine	1960).		An	extra	requirement	for	the	epistemic	role	I	outline	here,	that	is	not	necessarily	part	of	how-possibly	modeling,	is	that	the	conditions	contributing	to	the	phenomenon	observed	be	bare	bones	or	minimal.		If	the	Schelling	model	showed	that	racial	segregation	could	result,	in	principle,	from	surprising	but	elaborate,	or	unrealistic	conditions,	it	would	not	have	made	such	a	splash.		Philosopher	of	biology	Brett	Calcott	has	also	described	what	he	calls	‘how-MacGyvery’	models,	which	show	how	from	extremely	minimal	conditions	some	surprising	phenomenon	can	arise.9		(This	refers	to	the	80s	and	90s	TV	show	MacGyver,	where	the	title	character	routinely	built	technological	apparatuses	from	random	everyday	objects.)		The	role	I	am	outlining	here	is	similar,	but	not	identical.			An	extra	requirement	that	goes	beyond	how-MacGyvery	modeling	is	that	these	minimal	conditions	are	ones	we	think	might	actually	be	instantiated	in	the	world.		For	instance,	if	Schelling	had	showed	that	patterns	of	segregation	could	emerge	in	a	group	where	all	actors	only	wanted	to	live	on	the	corners	of	a	neighborhood,	no	one	would	care.		If	(Axtell,	Epstein,	and	Young	2001)	and	our	previous	work	showed	that	inequitable	norms	could	emerge	among	people	with	the	surprisingly	minimal	condition	that	they	like	cockatoos,	again,	it	would	be	completely	irrelevant.			One	reason	that	some	realism	is	necessary	for	these	models	to	play	the	how-minimally	role	I	am	outlining	is	that	they	give	important	counterfactual	information	about	the	world.		Whether	or	not	the	factors	in	the	model	are	at	play	in	the	real	world,	these	factors	could	be	at	play.		They	are	plausible	candidates	to	act	as	causes	in	the	real	world.		One	thing	we	learn	from	our	models	of	inequitable	norms	is	that	removing	implicit	bias,	stereotype	threat,	and	confirmation	bias	might	not	be	enough	to	fix	the	problem.		In	other	words,	the	sorts	of	interventions	being	implemented	by	businesses,	universities,	etc.	to	improve	inequity	are	not	doing	anything	about	a	set	of	conditions	which	occurs	in	these	organizations,	and	should	be	expected	to	generate	inequity	even	without	various	biases	at	play.			In	the	case	of	the	Schelling	model,	it	tells	us	that	even	if	we	manage	to	stop	predatory	mortgage	practices,	and	steering	by	real	estate	agents,	this	might	not	be	enough	to	stop	segregation.		As	briefly	described	in	the	outline,	this	sort	of	modeling	is	particularly	useful	when	it	comes	to	social	ills	–	segregation,	inequitable	norms,	etc.	–	for	the	reason	that	models	in	these	areas	are	often	aimed	at	generating	understanding	that	can	be	used	for	intervention.		In	both	of	these	cases,	we	learn	that	sensible,	current	interventions	might	not	have	the	desired	outcome	because	other	factors	can	easily	generate	inequity	and	segregation.	Notice	that	when	models	outline	minimal	conditions	for	inequity,	it	is	the	very	fact	that	they	do	not	capture	many	aspects	of	the	real	world	that	generates	their																																																									9	This	term	comes	from	public	talks,	rather	than	published	work.		For	an	example,	see	(Soriano	et	al.	2015).	
explanatory	power.		Implicit	bias,	or	more	pernicious	racism	could	be	added	to	these	models,	and	that	would,	in	some	ways,	improve	their	fit	to	the	world.		But	doing	so	would	obscure	the	observation	that	more	minimal	conditions	can	get	the	same	effect.		In	other	words,	we	could	not	draw	important	conclusions	about	counterfactual	conditions	if	we	altered	these	models	to	be	more	realistic.		In	this	way,	the	models	discussed	in	this	paper	are	similar	to	models	outlined	by	(Batterman	2002;	Batterman	and	Rice	2014)	who	show	how	a	lack	of	fit	to	the	world,	or	representative	power,	can	sometimes	enhance	a	model’s	ability	to	explain.	Before	concluding,	I’d	like	to	make	clear	how	the	models	described	in	section	three	reflect	the	sort	of	explanatory	plurality	I	described	above.		(The	plurality	which	I	cited	for	a	reason	to	pull	apart	how	we	think	of	models	and	how	we	think	of	their	explanatory	roles.)			Our	models	on	the	cultural	Red	King	effect,	for	instance,	play	at	least	three	separate,	explanatory	roles	within	one,	single	modeling	project	aimed	at	the	same	target	phenomena.		They,	1)	show	an	effect	that	is	potentially	at	play	in	the	real	world,	and	so	is	deserving	of	empirical	observation	10,	2)	outline	extremely	minimal	conditions	for	a	minority	group	to	end	up	disadvantaged	by	norms,	and	in	doing	so	provide	the	counterfactual	information	just	described,	and	3)	may	provide	a	minimalist	model	in	the	sense	that	they	capture	real	causal	factors	of	minority	disadvantage.		To	reiterate,	in	thinking	about	models	that	outline	minimal	conditions	for	inequity,	then,	we	shouldn’t	label	a	model	itself	by	the	epistemic	role	it	can	play.		Instead,	we	should	think	of	many	models	as	capable	to	play	this,	and	other,	epistemic	roles.		In	other	words,	we	shouldn’t	call	the	models	themselves	‘how-minimally’	or	‘minimalist’,	because	the	same	model	plays	multiple,	explanatory	roles	even	while	being	applied	to	the	same	target	system.		V:	Conclusion	The	goal	of	this	paper	was	to	pull	out	in	detail	an	epistemic	role	played	by	a	class	of	models	that	focus	on	inequity.		These	models	outline	minimal	conditions	for	inequity,	while	idealizing	away	from	causal	factors	that	are	very	likely	at	play	in	the	real	world.		Nonetheless,	in	identifying	minimal,	realistic	conditions	that	can	generate	patterns	of	inequity,	they	provide	important	counterfactual	information	about	the	target	system	that	is	especially	useful	for	planned	interventions.			One	broader	take-away	from	this	discussion	responds	to	worries	that	highly	idealized	models	cannot	inform	us	about	the	world.		In	fact,	the	epistemic	roles	that	models	play	are	promiscuous	and	varied.11		The	ways	that	models	can	be	used	as	tools	to	shine	light	on	the	world	are	too	many	to	be	quantified,	and	fully	general	claims	about	what	models	can	and	cannot	do	will	tend	to	be	wrong	for	this	reason.		As	we	saw	here,	both	Schelling’s	model	and	models	of	the	emergence	of	inequitable																																																									10	In	(Rosenstock,	Bruner,	and	O’Connor	2016)		we	call	this	‘how-potentially’	modeling,	because	it	involves	finding	something	that	could	potentially	be	happening	in	the	world,	and	directing	empirical	attention	to	this	phenomenon.	11	For	elaborations	on	this	claim	see	(Downes	1992;	O’Connor	and	Weatherall	2016).	
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